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SURVEY SECTION
Contract Law. Fraioli v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty In-
surance Co., 748 A.2d 273 (R.I. 2000). A carrier providing underin-
sured motorist (UIM) coverage must honor its policy commitments
regardless of specific language in the policy requiring prior consent
to any settlement agreements between the insured and the
tortfeasor when such a settlement does not prejudice the UIM
carrier.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On May 11, 1994, the plaintiff, Mario Fraioli (plaintiff) and
Vincent DiPippo (DiPippo) were involved in an automobile acci-
dent with Stephen Hay (tortfeasor).1 At the time of the accident,
the plaintiff was driving and DiPippo was in the passenger seat.2
Both men were injured by the tortfeasor.3 The plaintiff had unin-
sured/underinsured motorist coverage through AMICA Mutual In-
surance Company (Amica) and DiPippo carried insurance from
Prudential Insurance Company (Prudential).4 The tortfeasor was
insured though Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance
Company (Metropolitan) with a $25,000 limit of liability.5
Both the plaintiff and DiPippo were represented by Charles
Casale (Casale).6 In 1995, Casale sought permission from both
Arnica and Prudential to settle the respective claims against the
tortfeasor for the tortfeasor's policy limit of $25,000 per single per-
son. 7 Only Prudential gave permission to settle, thus ending
DiPippo's claim.8 Casale continued until May 1995 to attempt to
obtain Amica's consent to settle the plaintiffs claim for the same
$25,000 limit. 9 Due to Casale's repeated requests, Amica con-
ducted an asset check on the tortfeasor to determine the benefits of
going to trial rather than settling for the $25,000.10
In May 1995, Casale, for an unexplained reason, believed that
Amica had consented to settle the plaintiffs claim against the
1. See Fraioli v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 748 A.2d 273, 274 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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tortfeasor and Metropolitan for the $25,000 policy limit.'1 In fact,
Amica had not consented to settle the claim.12 Metropolitan had
never offered to settle with the plaintiff until Casale approached
them with Amica's apparent willingness to settle the claim for the
policy limits.' 3 Metropolitan accepted Casale's unauthorized set-
tlement offer.14 Under the plaintiffs policy with Amica, Amica
would now be liable to pay the plaintiff for the damages not cov-
ered by the underinsured tortfeasor, up to the plaintiffs policy
limits.
ANALYsis AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has previously held that
when both Rhode Island General Laws section 27-1-2.1(h) 15 and "a
consent exclusion in the insurance policy requir[ing] that a plain-
tiff obtain the consent of his or her underinsured insurance carrier
before settling with the tortfeasor" are read together, the failure to
get consent from one's underinsured insurance carrier will "render
the un[der]insured motorist's coverage inapplicable." 16 The Amica
policy contained such a consent clause. 17 The court explained that
such consent requirements "safeguard the insurer's right of subro-
gation" thus providing insurers some financial protection.' 8 How-
ever, Amica conceded that had Metropolitan made an offer to settle
the plaintiffs claim for the policy limit, Amica would have had to
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 275.
15. Section 27-7-2.1(h) of the Rhode Island General Laws states, in pertinent
part:
[iun the event that the person entitled to recover against an underinsured
motorist recovers from the insurer providing coverage pursuant to this
section, that insurer shall be entitled to subrogation rights against the
underinsured motorist and his or her insurance carrier. Release of the
tortfeasor with the consent of the company providing the underinsured
coverage shall not extinguish or bar the claim of the insured against the
underinsurance carrier regardless of whether the claim has been
liquidated.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2.1(h) (1956) (1999 Reenactment) (emphasis added).
16. Fraioli, 748 A.2d at 275 (citing Pickering v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 282
A.2d 584, 591 (R.I. 1971)).
17. See id. "We do not provide Uninsured Motorist Coverage for bodily injury
sustained by any person . . . if that person or the legal representative settles a
bodily injury claim without our consent." Id.
18. Id.
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accept since Amica's own asset check of the tortfeasor revealed no
appreciable assets. 19
The Rhode Island Supreme Court seized on the maxim "'ces-
sante ratione, cessat ipsa lex' (when there is no longer a reason for
a rule, the rule ceases to be effective)" in order to demonstrate that
the specific facts of this case were inapplicable to the general rule
that an insurance company must consent before being bound to a
settlement agreement. 20 In this case, since Amica acknowledged
that the tortfeasor had no appreciable assets it was not prejudiced
by the settlement with the tortfeasor's insurance company.21
Concurring Opinion
Justice Flanders concurred with the majority opinion, expres-
sing his opinion as to the rights of the insured and the insurance
carrier depending upon the specifics of each case. 22 Justice Flan-
ders reiterated the concerns of both the insurance companies and
those insured. 23 The concurrence sought to balance the needs of
the respective parties while agreeing that insureds should be able
to settle with a tortfeasor without prior approval from their UIM
carrier when such an agreement will not prejudice the UIM
carrier. 24
CONCLUSION
In Fraoli v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Co.,
the Rhode Island Supreme Court allowed recovery by an insured
on the UIM portion of their policy even though the insured settled
with the tortfeasor without the consent of their UIM carrier in the
limited situation where the UIM carrier was not prejudiced by
such a settlement.
Christopher A. Anderson
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 276-77.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 276-77.
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Contract Law. Hilton v. Fraioli, 763 A.2d 599 (R.I. 2000). When
a duration term for an employment contract is clear, is unambigu-
ous and is not susceptible to more than one interpretation, the in-
tent of the parties is irrelevant.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In Hilton v. Fraioli,1 the defendant, Vincent Fraioli (Fraioli),
who was in the process of opening a real estate agency, offered the
plaintiff, Margaret Hilton (Hilton), a position as the new agency's
sales manager.2 Hilton drafted an employment contract that in-
cluded compensation figures, a job description and the duration
provision: "This agreement is for one year from the time of signa-
tures and to be reviewed and renegotiated before the year end."3
The parties signed the contract on January 9, 1995. 4
Hilton worked part-time until the agency officially opened for
business in mid-March 1995, then worked full-time.5 Subse-
quently, Fraioli informed Hilton of his dissatisfaction with her job
performance. 6 On May 9, 1995, Fraioli informed Hilton that be-
cause of his dissatisfaction with her performance, he would not pay
the plaintiff her salary.7 On June 1, 1995, Hilton refused to con-
tinue her duties as sales manager, but stated that she would con-
tinue as an associate broker.8 On June 7, 1995, Hilton resigned.9
Hilton then commenced this action against Fraioli for breach of
contract. 10
After a bench trial, the trial justice determined that the em-
ployment contract unambiguously provided for a one-year term of
duration. 1 The trial justice concluded that Fraioli breached the
contract and owed Hilton damages of $12,333.12 Fraioli appealed.
1. 763 A.2d 599 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 601.
3. Id. (quoting the compensation agreement).
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
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ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The court stated that findings of fact by a trial justice in a
bench trial are given great weight and will not be disturbed except
for "a showing that the trial justice overlooked or misconceived ma-
terial evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong."13 The court found
no errors of fact in the case.14
In regard to interpreting the contract, it is a question of law
unless the terms are ambiguous, that is if the terms are reasonably
susceptible to more than one meaning. 15 Here, the court agreed
with the trial justice's determination that by applying ordinary,
plain meaning to the language, the contract as a whole and the
one-year duration term, are unambiguous and reasonably open to
only one interpretation. 16 Since the contract is unambiguous, the
intent of the parties is irrelevant.' 7 Thus, the defendant's claims
that the trial justice erred in considering the plaintiffs unilateral
expectations or that the contract should be construed against the
drafter are irrelevant. 18
The defendant next argued that the plaintiffs actions either
changed the terms of the contract or caused a breach of the con-
tract.19 The defendant asserted that the plaintiff, by working only
part-time before the agency officially opened, changing her position
from manager to broker, and then resigning from the agency alto-
gether, had transformed the contract to an at-will employment
contract.20
The court concurs with the trial justice's determination that it
was the defendant's own actions that prompted the actions of the
plaintiff.21 First, in regard to the plaintiffs working part-time,
there was no open office to manage when the contract was signed
in January.22 The agency did not officially open until March. Sec-
13. Id. at 602 (quoting Casco Indem. Co. v. O'Connor, 755 A.2d 779, 782 (R.I.
2000)).
14. See id.
15. See id. at 602 (citing Rotelli v. Catanzaro, 686 A.2d 91, 94 (R.I. 1996)).
16. See id. at 602.
17. See id. (citing Vincent Co. v. First Natl Supermarkets, Inc., 683 A.2d 361,
363 (R.I. 1996)).
18. See id. at 602.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
20011
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ond, the defendant refused to pay the plaintiff the salary called for
by the contract before the plaintiff changed her position or re-
signed.23 The plaintiffs actions occurred only after the defendant
himself breached the contract.24 Thus, what the plaintiff did at
the agency after the defendant breached the contract was
inconsequential. 25
The defendant also argued that the trial justice erred by deny-
ing his motion for a new trial based on the argument that his ter-
mination of the plaintiff was justified because of her unsatisfactory
job performance. 26 The instances in which a new trial may be
granted include manifest error of law or newly discoverable evi-
dence of sufficient importance to merit a new trial.27 Here, the
trial justice concluded that the defendant did not offer any new
evidence that was not discoverable to him at trial nor was there
manifest error of law in the judgment.28 The court found that the
trial justice did not err in denying the defendant's motion for a new
trial and denied the defendant's appeal. 29
CONCLUSION
In Hilton v. Fraioli, the court stated that the sales manager's
actions, after the owner had breached the employment contract,
have no bearing on the unambiguous, one-year duration term pro-
vided for in the contract.
Stan Pupecki
23. See id. at 602-03.
24. See id. at 603.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. (citing Finkelstein v. Finkelstein, 502 A.2d 350, 356 (R.I. 1985)).
28. See id. at 603.
29. See id.
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Contract Law. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. v. Bellini, 746
A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000). In an action alleging a statutory, reformation
and/or estoppel and waiver claim, and a claim of bad faith, the
claim of bad faith should be severed so that the possibility of hav-
ing acted in bad faith is eliminated if the defendant prevails on the
initial claims against it.1 Accordingly, discovery should be limited
to that information relevant to the underlying litigation separate
and apart from claims of bad faith. The more extensive discovery
needed to investigate claims of bad faith should only be allowed if
and when the accused party fails at defending against the underly-
ing causes of action which represent the origins of the bad faith
claim. 2
FACTS AND TRAVEL
On April 30, 1985, the defendant, Amitie Bellini (Bellini) con-
veyed her interest in a piece of property located on Atwood Avenue
to Norbell Realty Corporation (Norbell Realty).3 While not conclu-
sively established, the plaintiff, Imperial Casualty and Indemnity
Corporation (Imperial) stated its belief that Bellini was the princi-
pal officer and sole shareholder of Norbell Realty Corp.4 On May
12, 1985, Imperial issued a comprehensive liability insurance pol-
icy on multiple properties, including the Atwood Avenue parcel.5
The policy was issued to Bellini. Norbell Realty was not listed as
an insured on the May 12th policy.6
On October 8, 1985, Michael DeSantis (DeSantis), a United
States postal worker, was injured while on duty when he fell at the
Atwood Avenue property.7 In January 1986, Imperial received a
claim relating to DeSantis's injuries.8 Soon thereafter, DeSantis
filed an action against Norbell Realty seeking compensation for his
injuries.9 Imperial (after exercising a reservation of rights) unsuc-
1. See Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. Bellini, 746 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 135.
3. See id. at 131.
4. See id. at 131 n.l.
5. See id.
6. See id. However, on October 31, 1985 Norbell Realty was added to the
policy as an "additional insured" on a property on Pocasset Avenue in Providence.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
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cessfully defended Norbell Realty.10 The jury returned a verdict
for DeSantis in the amount of $235,000.11
Subsequent to the favorable judgment, DeSantis filed a claim
against Imperial.' 2 This action consisted of three claims. The first
claim alleged that DeSantis was a judgment creditor of Imperial's
insured, namely Norbell Realty;13 the second claim alleged that
Norbell Realty was in fact an implied insured at the time of the
accident and thus the policy should be reformed to reflect such;14
and the third claim alleged that Imperial was estopped from deny-
ing that Norbell Realty was an insured, and thus acted in bad faith
when it unreasonably denied coverage to Norbell Realty.15 In re-
sponse, Imperial moved to dismiss the complaint 16 and consolidate
the declaratory judgment action seeking clarification of its liabil-
ity 17 and DeSantis's suit against Imperial.' 8
The motion justice denied the motion to dismiss but granted
the consolidation.' 9 DeSantis then sought answers to interrogato-
ries and the production of Imperial's entire case file in order to es-
tablish the requisite connection between Imperial and Norbell
Realty.20 Imperial objected and asked that DeSantis's claim for
bad faith be severed from the remaining litigation and that discov-
ery be limited to information not privileged as work product pro-
duced for the Norbell Realty injury case.21 Both of Imperial's
requests were denied by the superior court.22
10. See id. Imperial, naming Bellini and Norbell Realty as parties (with De-
Santis intervening), asked the superior court for a declaratory judgment in order
to determine its liabilities under the terms and conditions of the policy covering
the Atwood Avenue property with Bellini and not Norbell Realty as the named
insured. This has not yet been adjudicated. Norbell Realty Corp. has since gone
out of business.
11. See id. at 132. The trial justice reduced the award to $155,000.
12. See id.
13. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 27-7-2 (1956) (1998 Reenactment) as the
basis for Imperial's liability for the judgment).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 131.
18. See id. at 132.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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Imperial filed a petition for certiorari, asking that the Rhode
Island Supreme Court review: 1) the denial of its motion to dismiss
the actions against it; 2) the denial of its motion to limit discovery;
and 3) the denial of its motion to sever the claim of bad faith from
the remaining litigation.23
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Motion to Dismiss, Standard of Review
Ordinarily the Rhode Island Supreme Court will refuse to
grant certiorari in interlocutory decisions. 24 However, when the
court agrees to offer such review it applies the same standard as
the lower court when it decides whether or not to grant the motion
in the first instance. 26 In this case, Imperial needed to show that
regardless of any of the facts that DeSantis could prove to support
his claims, DeSantis was still not entitled to relief.26
Ultimately, DeSantis had four claims against Imperial. First,
DeSantis claimed that Imperial was liable to him as a judgment
creditor under section 27-7-2 of the Rhode Island General Laws.27
Second, DeSantis requested that the insurance policy be reformed
to include Norbell Realty as an insured at the time of the acci-
dent.28 Third, DeSantis asserted that Imperial was estopped from
denying insurance coverage to Norbell Realty. 29 Fourth, DeSantis
alleged that Imperial acted in bad faith when it denied coverage to
Norbell Realty.30 Given that Imperial itself sought a declaratory
judgment from the superior court to "construe and interpret the
terms and conditions of the policy it issued"31 it is clear that even
Imperial was uncertain as to its financial liability under its own
policy. The resolution of Imperial's declaratory judgment and De-
Santis's claims could result in relief for DeSantis. Thus, the court
held that Imperial's motion to dismiss all of the claims against it
must fail. 32
23. See id.
24. See id. (citing Boucher v. McGovern, 639 A.2d 1369, 1373 (R.I. 1994)).
25. See id.
26. See id. (citing Garganta v. Mobile Vill., Inc., 730 A.2d 1, 3 (R.I. 1999)).
27. See id. at 133.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id. at 132.
32. See id. at 133.
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Motion to Sever Claim of Bad Faith
Imperial argued that the court erred in not granting the mo-
tion to sever the bad faith claim from the remaining litigation.
33
Imperial suggested that Bartlett v. John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Co.34 was directly on point and the court agreed. 35 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court had declared in Bartlett that when
confronted with a breach of contract and bad faith claim simulta-
neously, the courts must sever the causes of actions pursuant to
Rule 42(b) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure. 36
The case at hand extended Bartlett's mandatory severance of
simultaneous bad faith and breach of contract claims to include
severance of bad faith claims from statutory, reformation, estoppel
and waiver claims.37 In this instance, since the duty of Imperial to
Norbell Realty was in controversy, the legal obligations between
Imperial and N6rbell Realty had to be determined before assessing
any claim of bad faith.36
Motion to Limit Discovery
Since the bad faith claim should be separated and heard only
if still applicable after the other claims are resolved, so too should
the extent of discovery be limited to the matters actually being liti-
gated. Therefore, any discovery relevant to only the bad faith
claim is impermissible. First, allowing such an open-ended discov-
ery of bad faith claims would encourage the misuse of allegations
of bad faith as a device to access otherwise undiscoverable informa-
tion.3 9 Secondly, the right of the defendant to defend against the
underlying litigation outweighs the plaintiffs claim of bad faith
which may be eliminated by the successful defense by the accused
of the underlying litigation. 40
33. See id. at 134.
34. 538 A.2d 997 (R.I. 1988).
35. See Imperial Cas., 746 A.2d at 134.
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. (citing Bartlett, 538 A.2d at 1002).
40. See id. at 135.
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CONCLUSION
In Imperial Casualty & Indemnity Co. v. Bellini, the Rhode
Island Supreme Court extended the rule regarding the severance
of bad faith claims from other causes of action that could possibly
be the basis of the bad faith claim. The court also bifurcated the
discovery relating to the claim of bad faith and discovery related to
other claims. Presumably, if a plaintiff succeeds against the defen-
dant on the underlying claims, the issue of discovery for the pur-
poses of adjudicating the bad faith claim is reopened. Thus,
previously undiscoverable information can be disclosed in an at-
tempt to establish the elements required to prove a claim of bad
faith.
Christopher A. Anderson
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Contract Law. Lamoureaux v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance
Co., 751 A.2d 1290 (R.I. 2000). The Rhode Island Supreme Court
held that the plaintiffs acceptance and retention of a conditional
settlement check for a breach of contract claim against a defendant
insurance company was binding even though the plaintiff refused
to sign the settlement stipulation, and ordered the claim dismissed
with prejudice as the stipulation required. The court also held that
this dismissal of the plaintiffs breach of contract claim precluded
the plaintiff from pursuing her second claim that the defendant
had acted in bad faith, and directed that judgment on the pending
bad faith claim be entered for the defendant by the superior court.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff in this case, Debra L. Lamoureaux
(Lamoureaux), was the owner of rental property on Cleveland
Street in Providence.' Lamoureaux's rental building was insured
by the defendant-insurer, Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Com-
pany (Merrimack).2 On February 26, 1995, Lamoureaux informed
Merrimack that her property on Cleveland Street had been vandal-
ized in early February. 3 Two days later an insurance adjuster
from Merrimack was sent to inspect Lamoureaux's building and
determine the extent of the reported damages. 4 While examining
the premises and evaluating the damages, the adjuster noted that
the building appeared vacant and unoccupied. 5 According to a
clause in Merrimack's insurance policy with the plaintiff, coverage
for loss caused by vandalism or theft is excluded if a building is
found to have been left vacant by the insured for thirty consecutive
days preceding the loss.6 As a result of the insurance adjuster's
observations, Merrimack required Lamoureaux to produce suffi-
cient evidence that the building was in fact occupied for the re-
quired period of time before the date of the alleged vandalism.7
Lamoureaux submitted an electric bill for the second-floor apart-
ment in her building indicating that the electricity had been dis-
1. See Lamoureaux v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 751 A.2d 1290, 1291
(RI. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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continued to that apartment on January 3, 1995.8 Merrimack did
not find this bill adequate in establishing that the first-floor apart-
ment of Lamoureaux's building was occupied for the required
thirty-day period before the incident.9 Additionally, the two par-
ties disagreed on the amount of damages Lamoureaux suffered to
her property from the vandalism: Merrimack placed the total
amount of damages at $8,000, while Lamoureaux estimated the
figure to be around $39,000.10
Lamoureaux filed suit against Merrimack in January 1996, al-
leging both that the insurance company had breached its contract
with her by failing to acknowledge the claimed vandalism losses
and that Merrimack had acted in bad faith in denying coverage."
Merrimack denied that it was in breach or had acted in bad faith,
pointing out as an affirmative defense that it had not yet denied
Lamoureaux's claim and that Lamoureaux had failed to satisfy the
policy exclusion regarding the vacancy of her building for the
thirty days preceding the incident of theft or vandalism. 12
After unproductive settlement negotiations between the par-
ties and one mistrial, Lamoureaux and Merrimack agreed to settle
the breach of contract claim for $12,000.13 Merrimack conditioned
this settlement on Lamoureaux signing a stipulation characteriz-
ing the breach of contract claim as dismissed with prejudice. 14
Lamoureaux, however, wanted to have the stipulation indicate
that the breach of contract claim had been resolved in her favor.15
Merrimack was unwilling to agree to this stipulation because there
had never been a judicial determination made in her favor regard-
ing the breach of contract claim. 16 "Although the exact language of
the stipulation remained an open and ongoing question between
the parties," Lamoureaux did in fact obtain a settlement check
from Merrimack for $12,000.'- This check indicated that it was
intended to be "in full settlement of all claims" between the parties.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 1292.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Id.
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Lamoureaux's attorney changed this line to read "in full settle-
ment of all contract claims."18 Lamoureaux then refused to sign
the dismissal-with-prejudice stipulation agreement or return the
check to Merrimack, and instead filed a motion in the superior
court seeking to have Merrimack produce certain documents relat-
ing to her breach of contract claim so that she could pursue her
pending bad faith claim against Merrimack. 19 The hearing judge
granted Lamoureaux's motion to compel these documents, and
Merrimack filed a petition for a writ of certiorari from the supreme
court, asserting that Lamoureaux's breach of contract claim was
settled by Lamoureaux's acceptance of the settlement check, and
that no basis existed to support her pending claim of bad faith
against the defendant insurer. 20 Merrimack contended that the
court-ordered discovery regarding this claim was baseless. 21
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the court-ordered
discovery relating to Lamoureaux's bad faith claim was indeed
baseless, as the bad faith claim depended on a finding that the in-
surer was in breach for a positive resolution. 22 As the court said,
quoting Lewis v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 23 "Before a
bad-faith claim can even be considered, a plaintiff must prove that
the insurer breached its obligation under the insurance con-
tract."24 Here, the supreme court determined that Lamoureaux's
breach of contract claim was settled in such a way as to preclude
the plaintiff from continuing her bad faith claim against her in-
surer.25 The court took "particular notice of Lamoureaux's negoti-
ation of the $12,000 settlement check from Merrimack, conditioned
upon its being in full settlement of all claims, and her counsel's
unilateral and unauthorized modification of the full-settlement no-
tation contained on Merrimack's check and, as well, her continued
retention of the settlement amount."26
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. See id. at 1292-93.
21. See id. at 1293.
22. See id.
23. 742 A.2d 1207 (R.I. 2000).
24. See Lamoureaux, 751 A.2d at 1293 (quoting Lewis, 742 A.2d at 1209).
25. See id.
26. Id.
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The court quoted Pelletier v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance
Co.,27 which held that "a release or a contract of settlement of a
disputed claim when timely pleaded is a bar to an action on such
claim, so long as it is not rescinded or avoided by a return or offer
to return the money or other valuable consideration given for it."28
This holding supports the contention that Lamoureaux, in ac-
cepting Merrimack's $12,000, precluded herself from being able to
raise a bad faith action rising from the settled breach of contract
claim. The court also gave deference to the holding in Hull v. H.A.
Johnson & Co. 29 that "[the] one who takes money offered on condi-
tion, thereby accepts the condition, and in the absence of fraud or
other excuse, he [or she] is bound by [that] act."30 The Court con-
cluded that Lamoureaux's acceptance and negotiation of the settle-
ment check, especially including her counsel's unauthorized
attempt to insert the word "contract" into the document indicate
her intention to settle the breach of contract claim.31 Since there
was no judicial determination in favor of Lamoureaux on this
claim, its absence "served to undercut and preclude her bad-faith
claim against Merrimack." 32
CONCLUSION
In Lamoureaux v. Merrimack Mutual Fire Insurance Co., the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a party's acceptance and
retention of a conditional settlement offer constitutes an intention
to settle the claim, and such settlement precludes the adjudication
of pending claims arising out of the previously settled matter. Ac-
cordingly, the court granted the petition for certiorari, quashed the
discovery order relating to the bad faith claim and remanded the
case to the superior court. The supreme court directed the superior
court to dismiss Lamoureaux's breach of contract claim with
prejudice and enter judgment in favor of Merrimack for the pend-
ing claim of bad faith.
Lucy H. Holmes
27. 141 A. 79 (RI. 1928).
28. See Lamoureaux, 751 A.2d at 1293 (quoting Pelletier, 141 A. at 80).
29, 46 A. 182 (R.I. 1900).
30. See Lamoureaux, 751 A.2d at 1293 (quoting Hull, 46 A. at 182).
31. See id. at 1294.
32. Id.
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Contract Law. Lewis v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 742
A.2d 1207 (R.I. 2000). Before any claim of bad faith can be raised,
the plaintiff must first demonstrate that there was in fact a breach
of contract. Additionally, so long as there is any debatable issue
regarding defendant insurer's conduct there can be no finding of
bad faith.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
The plaintiff, Frank L. Lewis (Lewis) was the unfortunate vic-
tim of two automobile accidents in two months resulting in various
head, neck and back injuries.' Both accidents involved uninsured
motorists. On September 4, 1992, Lewis requested $200,000 from
his insurance company, the defendant (Nationwide).2 Apparently,
pursuant to the insurance contract,3 Nationwide requested that
Lewis furnish them with tax, medical and other information. 4 Na-
tionwide alleged that by December 21, 1993, they had not received
all of the requested information.5 Lewis contended that all ex-
isting documents had been turned over to Nationwide. 6
Lewis filed suit against Nationwide on December 7, 1993,
claiming breach of contract, negligence and bad faith.7 On May 3,
1994, Nationwide offered to settle the first accident for $100,000
and the second for $10,000.8 Lewis accepted the first accident offer
and submitted to binding arbitration for settlement of the second.9
In April 1995, the arbitrators awarded Lewis $42,000 for the sec-
ond accident.' 0
On April 28, 1998, Nationwide moved for, and the superior
court granted, summary judgment concerning claims of bad faith
stemming from any delay of payment for injuries sustained in the
second accident." The court based its decision on the following
1. See Lewis v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 742 A.2d 1207, 1208 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id. at n. 1 (the court never saw a copy of the insurance policy at issue in
the case).
4. See id. at 1208.
5. See id. at 1209.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
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grounds: (1) the court never received a copy of the insurance policy
and therefore could not determine if there was any needless delay
on the part of Nationwide; (2) since the medical records could not
definitely determine the extent of injuries attributable to the sec-
ond accident rather than the first, some delay was reasonable; and
(3) there was no "demand" for arbitration that might require Na-
tionwide to act more quickly.12 The Rhode Island Supreme Court
was then faced with the question as to whether summary judg-
ment was appropriate in this case.13
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Lewis claimed on appeal that a summary judgment decision
was inappropriate since there were material issues of fact in dis-
pute. 14 The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed the superior
court's summary judgment decision.' 5 The supreme court agreed
with two of the points made by the superior court. First the court
repeated that Lewis's failure to provide a copy of the insurance pol-
icy in question made it impossible for the lower court to determine
if Nationwide had breached any provision of the contract.' 6 The
court explained that to proceed on any claim of bad faith, the plain-
tiff must first demonstrate that there had been an actual breach of
the underlying contract. 17 Lewis relied on section 9-1-33 of the
Rhode Island General Laws named "Insurer's bad faith refusal to
pay a claim made under an insurance policy," which states "the
question of whether.., an insurer has acted in bad faith in refus-
ing to settle a claim [is] a question to be determined by the trier of
fact."18 This reliance was misplaced since the plaintiff ultimately
failed to prove any underlying breach of contract.19
The court went on to explain that since there were material
issues in dispute about which injuries were caused by each acci-
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 1209-10.
17. See id. at 1209 (citing Bartlett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 538
A.2d 997 (R.I. 1988)).
18. Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-33 (1956) (1994 Reenactment)).
19. See Lewis, 742 A.2d at 1209.
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dent, there was no unnecessary delay on the part of Nationwide.20
Further the court noted that Nationwide paid the claim at the
close of the arbitration and that Lewis was responsible for much of
the delay in the arbitration.
CONCLUSION
In order to proceed with a claim of bad faith, the plaintiff must
show that there was both a breach of contract and that there was
no debatable issue between the parties. In the instant case, the
plaintiff failed on both counts. He failed to provide the court with
the contract, depriving the court of the ability to determine the ex-
istence of any breach of contract. Further, the court found a rea-
sonable dispute between the parties that justified a delay in the
arbitration.
Christopher A. Anderson
20. See id. at 1209-10 (citing Bibeault v. Hanover Ins. Co., 417 A.2d 313, 319
(R.I. 1980).
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Contract Law. Pilot's Point Marina v. Cazzani Power Boat Man-
ufacturing, 745 A.2d 782 (R.I. 2000). In a case in which an affirma-
tive defense of lack of corporate capacity is not plead prior to trial
because the corporation did not lose its corporate status until al-
most a year after the inception of the action, the pleading may be
amended during trial. Furthermore, although the trial justice
failed to grant a continuance to allow the defendant to regain cor-
porate status, the defendant's rights were not prejudiced because
defendant could bring an action under section 9-1-22 of the Rhode
Island General Laws. Additionally, the trial justice did not over-
look or misconstrue material evidence in its findings of fact.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In November 1982, Pilot's Point Marina, Inc. (Pilot's Point)
and Cazzani Power Boat Manufacturing, Inc. (Cazzani) contracted
for Pilot's Point to manufacture a deck mold and hull mold using
Cazzani's prototype.' Cazzani took delivery of the hull mold sev-
eral months later, after having made partial payment on the con-
tract.2 Cazzani claimed to have difficulty using the hull mold and
refused to make additional payments on the contract or accept de-
livery of the deck mold.3 Pilot's Point filed a breach of contract
action against Cazzani in July 1994. 4 One month later, Cazzani
counterclaimed, alleging breach of express and implied warranties
and failure to satisfactorily perform the contract.6
During the course of a bench trial held in February and March
1998, Pilot's Point learned that Cazzani's certificate of incorpora-
tion had been revoked in August 1995.6 The trial justice took judi-
cial notice of the revocation. 7 Counsel for Pilot's Point sought
permission, during closing arguments, to amend its response in or-
der to include the affirmative defense of Cazzani's lack of corporate
capacity.8 The trial justice granted the motion over Cazzani's ob-
1. See Pilot's Point Marina v. Cazzani Power Boat Mfg., 745 A.2d 782, 783
(R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
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jection.9 The trial justice then denied Cazzani's request for a con-
tinuance in order to have time to get the revocation vacated. 10
Ultimately, the trial justice entered judgment in favor of Pilot's
Point and dismissed Cazzani's counterclaim, finding that Cazzani
lacked capacity to sue."
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Cazzani appealed on the basis that the trial justice erred in
three respects by: 1) permitting Pilot's Point to amend its response
to the counterclaim, 2) denying its motion for a continuance and 3)
overlooking and misconstruing material evidence concerning the
quality of workmanship with regard to the deck mold.' 2
Permission to amend counterclaim
In support of its argument that Pilot's Point should not have
been allowed to amend its response to the counterclaim, Cazzani
cited World-Wide Computer Resources, Inc. v. Arthur Kaufman
Sales Co.'3 In that case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held
that the trial justice erred by permitting a defendant to amend an
answer when the suit had been filed four years after commence-
ment of the action in order to plead lack of corporate capacity as a
defense. 1 4 The trial justice in the case at bar found that case inap-
plicable due to the fact that in World-Wide the lack of corporate
capacity defense could have been made when the suit had been
filed. Here, however, Cazzani was a valid corporation at the com-
mencement of the action and did not lose its corporate status until
August 1995, almost a year after suit was brought, and almost
three years before the trial.15 Since Pilot's Point could not have
made the affirmative defense sooner, the trial justice was not in
error for allowing the amendment of the response.' 6
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 783-84.
13. See id. at 784 (citing World-Wide Computer Resources v. Arthur Kaufman
Sales, 615 A.2d 122 (R.I. 1992)).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id. (citing World-Wide, 615 A.2d at 124-25).
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Denial of motion for continuance
Cazzani argued that the trial justice should have granted its
motion for continuance because it might have been able to rein-
state the certificate of incorporation had the continuance been
granted and the counterclaim would then not have been dis-
missed. 17 The Rhode Island Supreme Court found no prejudice
against Cazzani because Cazzani could proceed on a separate
claim after regaining its corporate capacity.' 8 Cazzani would have
one year to commence a new action from the time of the termina-
tion.19 The court conceded that defendant would not be allowed to
relitigate facts supporting its claim in this new action. However,
the court noted that the dismissal of the counterclaim did not take
place until after Cazzani had rested its case. The court reasoned
that Cazzani had been given a full and fair opportunity to litigate
the facts of the case. The court held, therefore, that there was no
error in the trial justice's denying the continuance because of Caz-
zani's failure to show any legal harm.20
Interpretation of material evidence
The appellant argued that the trial justice had erred by "over-
looking and misconstruing material evidence" with regard to the
deck mold manufactured by Pilot's Point. 21 The trial justice found
that the deck mold was constructed in a "workmanlike manner."22
As a result, the trial justice included the cost of storing the deck
mold in the damages awarded to Pilot's Point.23 The Rhode Island
Supreme Court has consistently deferred to the factual findings of
a trial justice in a bench trial "unless the justice has overlooked or
misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong."24
The trial justice clearly articulated on the record his reasons for
finding that the deck mold was constructed in a "workmanlike
manner."25 In addition, the trial justice included the storage costs
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. (citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-22 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
20. See id. at 785.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 785 (quoting State v. Collins, 679 A.2d at 862, 865 (R.I. 1996)).
25. See id. at 785-86.
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in the damage award due to the testimony that Cazzani never for-
mally rejected the deck mold.26
After reviewing each of the defendant's three claims, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that there was no error.27
Therefore, the defendant's appeal was denied and dismissed and
the judgment of the superior court was affirmed. 28
CONCLUSION
In this case, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that the
trial justice had not erred in allowing plaintiff to amend its reply to
defendant's counterclaim to plead defendant's lack of corporate ca-
pacity. Because the defendant had not lost its corporate status un-
til almost a year after the action had been brought, plaintiff could
move to amend its reply at trial nearly three years later. Addition-
ally, the defendant failed to show that its rights had been
prejudiced when the trial justice refused to grant defendant's mo-
tion for a continuance so that defendant could regain its corporate
status. Although defendant's counterclaim was dismissed, section
9-1-22 of the Rhode Island General Laws allowed defendant to
bring a new action to press its claims. Finally, because the defen-
dant had not formally rejected the deck mold, the court affirmed
the trial court's award of costs the plaintiff incurred in storing the
rejected mold.
Ann B. Sheppard
26. See id. at 786.
27. See id.
28. See id.
